Caught between Iran and Saudi Arabia, can Pakistan stay neutral for long?
Caught between Iran and Saudi Arabia, can Pakistan stay neutral for long?
Pakistan manages its partnership with Riyadh while avoiding conflict with Tehran as Iran attacks targets in the Gulf. However, many predict that it would be difficult to maintain this position as the fight intensifies.
Islamabad, Pakistan — Pakistan is feeling the effects of a war in which Iranian missiles and drones have landed on Israel in retaliation, while US-Israeli attacks have killed over a thousand people in Iran, including the country's supreme leader, Ali Khamenei.
Pakistan is in a difficult situation since Iranian missiles and drones have attacked six Gulf nations.
Millions of its workers live in Saudi Arabia and other Gulf countries, and the country shares a 900-kilometer (559-mile) border with Iran in the southwest.
By establishing a formal mutual defense pact in September of last year, Islamabad has further strengthened its long-standing relations with Riyadh by pledging to take hostility against one another as aggression against both.
The question of what Islamabad would do if it is drawn into the conflict is becoming more pressing in Pakistan as Iranian drones and ballistic missiles continue to threaten Gulf states.
Thus far, Islamabad has responded by making a lot of phone calls to regional leaders, including as Saudi Arabia and Iran.
Pakistan denounced the assaults as "unwarranted" after Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei was assassinated on February 28 by US-Israeli bombings. It also denounced as "blatant abuses of sovereignty" Iran's retaliation strikes on Gulf states within hours.
Ishaq Dar, the deputy prime minister and foreign minister, initiated what he later referred to as "shuttle contact" between Tehran and Riyadh while he was in Riyadh for an Organization of Islamic Cooperation meeting when the violence started last week.
Speaking in the Senate on March 3 and at a press conference later that day, Dar revealed that he had personally reminded Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi of Pakistan's defense commitments to Saudi Arabia.
"Everyone is aware of our defense agreement with Saudi Arabia," Dar stated. "I instructed the Iranian leadership to handle our agreement with Saudi Arabia."
He claimed that Araghchi requested assurances that Iran would not be attacked from Saudi territory. Dar claimed to have received those guarantees from Riyadh and gave credit to the backchannel communication for reducing the scope of Iranian attacks on the country.
Alireza Enayati, Iran's ambassador to Saudi Arabia, stated on March 5 that his nation applauded Saudi Arabia's promise not to let the use of its territory or airspace during the ongoing conflict with the United States and Israel.
He stated in an interview, "We appreciate what we have frequently heard from Saudi Arabia—that it does not allow its airspace, waters, or land to be utilized against the Islamic Republic of Iran."
However, Saudi Arabia's defense ministry reported that it had intercepted three ballistic missiles that were aimed at the Prince Sultan Air Base in the early hours of March 6, just one day later. Hours later, Saudi Defense Minister Prince Khalid bin Salman met with Pakistan's Field Marshal Asim Munir in Riyadh. According to the Saudi minister's post on X, the two "discussed Iranian attacks on the Kingdom and the measures needed to halt them within the framework" of their mutual defense agreement.
Analysts predict that Pakistan's balancing act between two close allies may get more difficult as the conflict intensifies.
A defense agreement under duress
Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif, and army chief Asim Munir signed the Strategic Mutual Defence Agreement on September 17, 2025, in Riyadh. It was Pakistan's biggest formal defense pledge in decades.
Any assault against one nation will be deemed hostility against both, according to its main clause. Although analysts have advised against viewing it as an automatic trigger for military involvement, the phrasing was based on collective defense principles akin to NATO's Article 5.
The six Gulf Cooperation Council nations—Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates—lost faith in US security commitments after Israel attacked Hamas officials in Doha in September 2025.
An estimated 1,500 to 2,000 Pakistani troops are still stationed in Saudi Arabia as a result of the nuclear-armed nation's decades-long military ties with the monarchy.
The agreement is currently being put to the test in circumstances that neither party expected.
According to Umer Karim, an associate fellow at the King Faisal Center for Research and Islamic Studies in Riyadh, Pakistan's current situation is the result of a calculation error.
He contended that Islamabad probably never anticipated being sandwiched between Tehran and Riyadh, especially following the 2023 rapprochement between Saudi Arabia and Iran mediated by China.
When it came to Saudi defense, Pakistani officials were always cautious not to make a formal move. The current army head carried it out for the first time, and while there are significant potential benefits, there are also significant drawbacks, Karim told Al Jazeera.
"If Pakistan does not fulfill its pledges now, the relationship would be irreparably harmed, and perhaps this is the last time the Saudis will test Pakistan," he continued.
Following a parliamentary resolution that the nation must maintain its neutrality, it turned down a direct request from Saudi Arabia to join the military coalition fighting in Yemen in 2015.
That incident was brought up by Aziz Alghashian, senior non-resident fellow at the Gulf International Forum in Riyadh. The Saudi-Pakistan deal has obvious limitations. Alghashian told Al Jazeera, "Treaties are only as strong as the political calculations and political will behind them."
However, history professor Ilhan Niaz of Islamabad's Quaid-e-Azam University stated that "Pakistan will come to Saudi Arabia's rescue" if Saudi Arabia feels sufficiently threatened by Iran to openly ask Pakistan for military support.
He told Al Jazeera, "Doing otherwise will harm Pakistan's legitimacy."
Iran's restriction
Pakistan's situation is complicated by the fact that, should Riyadh request military support, it cannot afford to see Iran as merely an enemy.
The two nations have substantial trade links, a long and porous border, and a recent increase in diplomatic contact. In August 2025, Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian traveled to Islamabad, and the two administrations continue to communicate both formally and informally.
Niaz admitted that Tehran has also been "a challenging neighbor," citing the series of cross-border strikes that Iran started in January 2024 as proof of the volatility of the relationship.
Nevertheless, he claimed that Pakistan has "important national interests" in maintaining Iran's territorial integrity and stability.
"Iran's fall into civil war, its split into warring nations, and the growth of Israeli power to Pakistan's western frontiers are developments that profoundly, and rightfully, worry Islamabad," he stated.
The US-Israel strikes and Iran's reaction have already had immediate domestic repercussions.
At least 23 people were killed in rallies across Pakistan after Khamenei's assassination, prompting the deployment of the army and the imposition of a three-day curfew in Gilgit-Baltistan. The Shia community in Pakistan, which is thought to comprise between 15 and 20 percent of the country's 250 million people, was the main force behind the rallies. They have historically mobilized in response to events involving Iran.
An additional level of risk is added by Pakistan's deadly sectarian past.
Over the past ten years, thousands of Pakistani warriors have joined the Zainabiyoun Brigade, a Shia militia of Pakistani descent that is trained, financed, and led by Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. Many Syrian activists accuse them of conducting sectarian violence, despite the fact that many of them fought in Syria against ISIL (ISIS).
More than 130 individuals were killed in sectarian conflicts in the last weeks of 2024 alone in Pakistan's northwest Kurram province, which serves as the Zainabiyoun's main recruitment site.
Although the group was officially outlawed in Pakistan in 2024, many people do not think the classification has had much of an impact on breaking up its networks.
Analysts caution that if Iran's dispute with Pakistan's Gulf allies intensifies, fighters toughened in Syria's civil war may switch from a defensive to an offensive stance on Pakistani territory.
Amir Rana, executive director of the Pak Institute of Peace Studies and a security expert based in Islamabad, told Al Jazeera, "Iran has significant influence over Shia organizations in Pakistan." Additionally, Balochistan is already a very unstable region. The consequences for Pakistan would be dire if there was any conflict.
Balochistan, a province in Pakistan that borders Iran, has been the focal point of a separatist movement for many years. Tehran-based political analyst Muhammad Khatibi stated, "That truth cannot be disregarded," emphasizing how Islamabad's options are limited by geography.
Khatibi told Al Jazeera, "Any idea that Islamabad is collaborating militarily against Tehran might inflame domestic sectarian differences in ways that would be very difficult to restrain in a full-scale regional war."
According to analysts, Pakistan's domestic limitations make direct offensive military action against Iran—such as the use of combat aircraft or strikes on Iranian territory—unfeasible.
Islamabad's current stance, according to Rana, is an effort to appease both sides.
"Iran's main threat is air strikes using drones and missiles, and Pakistan can support Saudi Arabia in this regard." However, that would entail Pakistan joining the conflict, which raises serious concerns, he stated.
The best course of action, he continued, may be for Pakistan to maintain diplomatic relations with Iran while secretly supporting Saudi Arabia.
Alghashian concurred, stating that air defense cooperation would be both "militarily meaningful and politically acceptable" and the most tangible role Pakistan could play.
He stated, "They may assist generate more air defense capabilities." "This is real, it is defensive, and Pakistan benefits from Saudi Arabia's increased stability and prosperity."
However, Karim cautioned that Pakistan's window for striking a balance might be closing more quickly than Islamabad is aware.
"It is only a matter of time that Saudi Arabia will ask Pakistan to assist to its defense as the crisis reaches a tipping point and when Saudi energy installations and infrastructure are attacked," he stated.
He went on to say that increased cooperation could have political repercussions at home and that Pakistan's own air defenses could be dangerously exposed if it deploys air defense equipment to Saudi Arabia.
Islamabad's most powerful tool at the moment is diplomacy, which it uses to gain the trust of both Tehran and Riyadh. Pakistan should defend that stance "at all costs," according to Khatibi.
"Being a mediator and utilizing its connections with both parties is Pakistan's most practical stance. Pakistan's deployment of military into an anti-Iran coalition is quite unlikely. He stated that the dangers would exceed the advantages.
Pakistan's stakes
A decision by the Gulf Cooperation Council to immediately enter the conflict would be the least favorable situation for Islamabad, and the warning signs are growing.
Iranian assaults have "passed a red line," according to both Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.
The United States, Bahrain, Jordan, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates "reaffirm the right to self-defense in the face of these attacks," according to a joint statement released on March 1.
Such an escalation could have dire repercussions for Pakistan.
Remittances from the Gulf provide vital foreign cash for an economy still recovering from a balance of payments crisis, while millions of Pakistani workers live and work in Gulf states.
According to Khatibi, Pakistan's financial situation will be directly impacted by any protracted regional conflict that undermines Gulf economy.
He noted Pakistan's significant reliance on Gulf states for its energy needs and stated, "Energy prices could possibly soar, adding more hardship."
Two days prior to the US-Israeli bombings, Pakistan started its own armed conflict with the Afghan Taliban.
Increased involvement in the regional crisis could lead to internal instability, Karim cautioned.
He warned that "sectarian warfare can rekindle, bringing the country back to the violent 1990s." Such an event will further erode the government's already weak political legitimacy.
Alghashian also emphasized Pakistan's unwillingness to become involved in the war.
Saudi Arabia is being pulled into this conflict even though it does not want to be involved. Additionally, Pakistan will undoubtedly object to being drawn into a conflict that they did not want to be involved in. He argues, "It just would not make sense."
However, Niaz stated that the calculation might become inevitable if Islamabad is ultimately forced to make a decision due to the crisis.
"The Saudis would definitely win if Tehran had Pakistan choose between Iran and Saudi Arabia."
