In Iran, the US may still attempt to use the ethnic card.
In Iran, the US may still attempt to use the ethnic card.
However, historical precedent and contemporary geopolitical conditions demonstrate that such a tactic is bound to fail.
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| On June 21, 2025, fighters from the Kurdistan Free Life Party (PJAK), an Iranian Kurdish resistance party, in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, close to the Iranian border, outside of Sulaimaniya, Iraq |
There are still a lot of unanswered issues regarding the objectives and geographic scope of the US's impending ground invasion of Iran. Some possibilities call for concentrating on a few of the Gulf's islands, while others call for collaborating with regional rebel organizations.
Washington appeared to experiment with the notion of aiding opposition groups from Iran's sizable Kurdish minority in order to start a proxy war early in the conflict.
The Israeli media said that Mossad's initial attempts to incite attacks by Kurdish organizations in northwest Iran were unsuccessful because of "leaks, distrust." Iran strengthened its defenses in the region and exerted pressure on the government of Iraqi Kurdistan, the home of Iranian Kurdish organizations.
US President Donald Trump admitted last week that the US gave the Kurds weaponry in an interview with Fox News.
As his administration works to develop an exit plan from the conflict, more action involving Kurdish or other ethnic resistance groups may still be considered. It could sound like a good idea to support regional uprisings in order to undermine Tehran, but will it be successful?
Iran's vulnerabilities
An ancient military strategy that the US has employed numerous times in the Middle East is inciting ethnic or religious conflicts within the enemy camp. Trump is probably searching for methods to expand its military capability and exert pressure on the Tehrani leadership. There may be some chances for such given Iran's internal divisions.
Tehran has neglected to address the mounting complaints of different minority groups on the country's outskirts over the last thirty years. While Arab and Kurdish Shia Muslims experience prejudice from ethnic Persians, Sunni Arabs, Kurds, and Balochis feel excluded in the Shi'a dominant state.
Over the past thirty years, this has resulted in a number of anti-government mobilizations, including armed ones.
For many years, Iraqi-based Kurdish armed groups have been active in northwest Iran. Waves of large-scale protests have also occurred in Kurdish areas; the most recent one occurred in the fall of 2022 when a Kurdish lady was killed by morality police in Tehran.
There have also been other active armed groups. 29 people were murdered in an attack on a military parade in Ahvaz in 2018; an Arab separatist organization claimed responsibility. At least 27 people were killed when Baluchi rebels from the Jaish Al Adl group assaulted an IRGC bus in 2019. In 2023, the same group raided a police station, killing eleven security guards. Then, in 2024, at least ninety persons were killed when a mourner's procession for the late General Qasem Sulaimani was bombed in the southeastern city of Kerman; ISIL claimed responsibility.
These episodes all highlight Iran's peripheral vulnerabilities, which its adversaries have long attempted to take advantage of. Trump should consider the experiences of those who have attempted to overthrow the Tehrani government by inciting ethnoreligious uprisings if he chooses to follow that course.
Failures in the past
Among them was Saddam Hussein, the ruler of Iraq. He saw an opening in the ethnic conflict between Arabs and Kurds that the Islamic Republic had inherited from the monarchy when he made the decision to invade Iran in 1980. Both minority were urged to launch insurrections by Saddam Hussein.
The Kurdish Democratic Party of Iran (KDP-I) had already started an uprising against the newly established Islamic Republic in 1979 by the time Iraqi troops invaded Iranian territory. The KDP-I eventually gained some territory and held it for months thanks to Iraq's financial and military support, but by 1982–1983, internal strife and Tehran's ruthless Revolutionary Guards campaign had put an end to the uprising.
Additionally, Saddam attempted to incite an uprising among the Arabs in the south; in 1980, some Iranian Arab separatist organizations fought alongside Iraqi forces in the conflict for the Iranian city of Khorramshahr. However, the Sunni Arab community did not participate in significant numbers. Shi'a Arabs did not want to take part in what they perceived as an invasion by a Sunni-dominated Iraqi government. Consequently, Saddam never achieved the widespread Arab revolt he had hoped for.
George W. Bush, the president of the United States, attempted to apply a similar strategy against Iran twenty years later. He gave the CIA and other intelligence services permission to conduct clandestine operations in Iran and transfer funds and equipment to certain armed opposition groups.
Bush, like Saddam, was unable to incite uprisings in Iran. This is due not just to the Islamic Republic's ability to respond quickly and decisively to security issues, but also to the fact that attempts to stir uprisings never gained sufficient traction. This is because some of Iran's minorities have successfully assimilated into the country's elite and core. Iran's socioeconomic conditions and ethno-religious identities are too complicated to fit into a straightforward narrative of the Persian majority's ethnic subjugation.
Today's chances of success
It is clearly evident that US and Israeli attempts to decapitate the Iranian regime in order to incite a mass rebellion have failed more than a month into the war on Iran.
There is now no indication that attempts to incite ethnic uprisings would be more effective. Support for separatist organizations by the US and Israel is unlikely to result in anything more than small-scale conflicts or isolated acts of sabotage.
Since Iran is engaged in a techno-guerilla war and its most valued weapons are missiles and drones rather than ground troops, this would not take vital military resources and attention away from the conflict with the US and Israel.
Furthermore, major allies like Pakistan and Turkey strongly oppose US funding for separatist organizations in the region. Baluch insurgents in the southwest of the nation have been carrying out brutal attacks against Islamabad. Given its own lengthy history of turmoil in the country's Kurdish regions, Ankara views any backing for Kurdish parties as extremely delicate.
Iraq would be hesitant to back such initiatives as well. By permitting US-Israeli assistance for the Iranian Kurds to occur on Iraqi soil, the Baghdad government and the Kurdistan Regional Government would not run the risk of Iranian reprisals.
On paper, inciting ethnic insurgencies might seem like a smart idea, but in practice, it would be a formula for disaster for the Trump administration, which is already facing enough setbacks in its war on Iran.
